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Comparative Constitutional Reasoning 
Jayadevan S Nair* 
Andras Jakab, Arthur Dyevre, et. al. (eds.), Comparative 
Constitutional Reasoning, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2017; ISBN No.: 9781107085589. 
The book, which is based on the Conreason Project, is a study of 
mammoth proportions, to give a new shape and direction to the 
study of comparative constitutional academics. The project with its 
global scale and ambition does justice to its objective – to unearth 
the constitutional reasoning trends in constitutional courts.1 At 
least by its magnitude and nuanced detailing, the project is a brave 
resolve to decode the behaviour of constitutional courts in select 
jurisdictions. In doing so, the project has picked on an assortment 
of apex courts, across the globe, including supra national fora.  The 
project and the ensuing book are the result of an arduous resolve, 
planning and execution, over a period of around five years(since 
2011).  The book is a compendium of the project, after it had 
reached a culmination, with respect to its findings. Comparative 
constitutional law projects have been attempted before, but most of 
them had a normative focus and not a quantitative approach.   The 
Conreason project treads differently in this regard. 
The authors clarify that the study solely focusses on constitutional 
courts and not on the constitutional reasoning tendered by the 
executive and legislative authorities. The focus is on the 
‘justificatory’ reasons articulated (and perhaps in certain 
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circumstances not articulated by the courts) to justify or 
substantiate their decisions.  The focus is on ‘judicial actors’- ‘a 
judicial institution explicitly erected as a constitutional court or 
tribunal or the top most court with the power to review legal rules 
on constitutional grounds, irrespective of its name or title  
constitutional law  means. According to the authors, the rules 
enjoying the highest rank in the legal order (having precedence 
over other rules). To this list there are however three qualified 
entries – the Highest court of the United Kingdom, the European 
Court of Justice and European Court of Human rights.   
The project team leaders handed over to the contributors, the task 
of ascertaining 40 leading cases in their jurisdiction and a 
questionnaire to be answered, based on the legal system and an 
analysis of the 40 case laws. With a list of 40 cases from each of the 
18 jurisdictions,2 the study focusses on certain parameters for the 
assessment of the performance and behaviour of the constitutional 
courts. The book does not provide a satisfactory idea as to why the 
study was confined to these 18 jurisdictions and the rationale 
underlying the choice of these 40 cases. Amusingly, the world’s 
largest democracy and the busiest constitutional court, in the world 
by the yardstick of a day’s docket list – Supreme Court of India, 
does not figure in the list of 18 jurisdictions. In fact, South Asia 
does not find space among the noted constitutional courts in the 
world. Interestingly, the western constitutionalism, specifically in 
Europe finds, itself under scrutiny as the major object of study.  The 
rationale underlying the selection of the jurisdictions lacks clarity 
and convincing logic. The list includes Israel and Taiwan along the 
                                                          
2 The eighteen jurisdictions include the High Court of Australia , The 
Austrian Constitutional Court , The Supreme Federal Tribunal of Brazil, 
The Supreme Court of Canada, The Constitutional Court of the Czech 
Republic, The European Court of Human Rights, The European Court of 
Justice ,The French Constitutional Council , The German  Federal 
Constitutional Court, The Constitutional Court of Hungary, The Supreme 
Court of Ireland, The Israeli Supreme Court, The Constitutional Court of 
Italy, The Constitutional Court of South Africa, The Spanish 
Constitutional Court, The Constitutional Court of Taiwan, The Supreme 
Court (House of Lords) of the United Kingdom, The Supreme Court of the 
United States.         
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with the usual constitutional behemoth – the United states of 
America. The inclusion of United Kingdom without a consolidated 
written constitution is surprising, considering the absence of 
judicial review and the recent establishment of the Supreme court 
in 2010, with no power of judicial review over primary legislation 
(other than the power of declaring incompatibility).  
As admitted by the authors, the selection has an overwhelming 
European flavour to it – Taiwan, Brazil, Israel and South Africa, 
being the only exceptions to it. The selection also includes the supra 
national for a rendering functions akin to constitutional courts – the 
European court of justice and the European court of human rights. 
While all continents have been represented, the project menu has 
an overwhelming European flavour. Out of 18 jurisdictions, whose 
constitutional courts are under study, 16 are European or erstwhile 
colonies. The sole Asian representation is from the apex court of 
Taiwan.  
The 18 texts are woven around a questionnaire that seeks to 
unravel the judicial character and behaviour of 18 constitutional 
courts respectively. Among the many interesting parameters 
required to be assessed, is the one pertaining to ‘judicial candour 
and judicial rhetoric’.  It seeks to assess the value judgements 
expressed by the courts and its echo in the judgements. It probes 
into nuanced aspects of judicial behaviour, by attempting answers 
to questions, such as the target audience of the reasoning of the 
judgement, the degree of generalisation and the quantum of 
rhetoric – the emotional tone apparent in the opinion. The 
questions seek to uncover the trend in the argumentative recourses 
by the courts such as the use of analogies, debate using the text of 
the constitution and ordinary meaning of words in the constitution. 
The study seeks to analyse the prevalence and application of 
harmonising arguments, use of precedents, doctrinal analyses of 
legal concepts or principles. The questionnaire seeks to identify 
even the arguments of silence in the judicial opinions, besides the 
recognition of teleological or purposive arguments. It seeks to map 
the judicial argumentative patterns for instance, the recourse to 
non-legal materials and sources of scholarship and foreign national 
laws and precedents.  The questionnaire handed over to the 
investigators in the 18 jurisdictions had to be answered within a 
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cap of 15000 words. This was ostensibly with an eye on publication 
at a later point of time. The investigators have produced 
sufficiently rich research within the bounds of word limit and in 
certain instances have tried to go beyond the questionnaire as well. 
The study throws up surprising patterns in the functioning and 
attitudes of the constitutional courts. For instance, the 
constitutional court in Israel – without a written constitution had 
identified 13 basic laws as its constitutional text, thereby heralding 
a suo-motu induced constitutional revolution in judicial review. In 
Israel, litigation based on a certain constitutional text is a post 1995 
phenomenon, pioneered by the Supreme Court and not through a 
legislative initiative3.  This is a benchmark in the advancement of 
constitutionalism and a quiet changeover and shift from the stoic 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. A similar trend can be 
witnessed in France, post 1970, through the assertiveness of a 
constitutional review culture, by the Constitutional Council. This 
evidences the growth of constitutionalism and a culture of judicial 
review, seeping into the administration of justice, in different 
corners of the globe; which pointer to growth in judicial trust, 
globally. 
In several jurisdictions, one can discern a change sweeping over the 
composition of constitutional courts and the widening of the source 
of expertise on the bench. One can notice the involvement of the 
legal academia in the working of the courts – the elevation of 
professors to the bench.   Such trends are important lessons for the 
functioning of the Indian courts,  that are still to accommodate legal 
academia in decision making and administration of justice. 
The team has successfully compiled a data set (the CONREASON 
Dataset4 ), encompassing the argumentative characteristics of 760 
landmark decisions. There is a sense of euphoria in being able to 
make an original contribution through the data set. Through the 
questionnaire, the idea was to enhance ‘comparability’ across 
jurisdictions. The questionnaire reflected the following common 
                                                          
3 CA6821/93United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Midgal Coperative Village 
(1995)- the court identified a constitution for Israel 
4 The full dataset based on which the analysis is based on is available at 
www. cambridge /9781107085589 
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queries across the jurisdictions under the study - to describe the 
legal, political, institutional and academic context, the design of the 
courts and status of constitutional litigation, the number and 
composition of judges, the relationship between the academia, the 
bar and the bench, the recourse to academia in case of doubt, the 
reference to pivotal fundamental principles and doctrines such as 
the rule of law and separation of powers. The influence of 
comparative law in adjudication is also an object of the study. A 
novel attempt has been to define the structure of constitutional 
arguments, by delineating the arguments into three structures or 
modes5. The report not only explains, but also brings to the fore, 
the predilections and shortcomings in argumentative patterns 
resorted to by the courts. The study maps a certain constitutional 
behavioural pattern and etches the constitutional culture exuded by 
these jurisdictions, to provide a dependable predictability to the 
growing discipline of comparative constitutional law.  
Each one of the contributors appear to have borne in mind, the 
need to steer clear of heavy jargon which brings in a sense of relief, 
at being able to read and assimilate, without brooding over 
concepts and language – usually a semantic battle ground. The 
work tries to rise over these technicalities and communicates the 
essence of the herculean endeavour. The conclusions segment is 
marked by inferences from the research applied and is articulated 
in a reader friendly manner.    
It is noteworthy that the project scans cases from different systems- 
from civil to common law systems- the common strand among 
them being the fact,  that the decisions under scrutiny are all from 
their apex courts- constitutional courts. The study brings to the fore 
interesting details in the judicial process and deliberations in these 
constitutional courts. For instance, in some of the jurisdictions, the 
reasoning goes beyond the strict morbid application of legal tools, 
to quips from even songs and poems and avante garde literature.  
Such recourses find resonance in the tools employed by the 
reasoning of several courts, in arriving at decisions. The study also 
                                                          
5 The team calls it one-line conclusive argumentation, parallel conclusive 
arguments and parallel individually in conclusive but together conclusive 
arguments.   
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discerns the reference and recourse to non-legal premises of 
argumentation resorted by the courts – for instance sociological, 
economic and moral grounds.  
Judicial systems adopt divergent approaches to voice a judgement. 
While separate judgements are accepted   from the bench, in the 
common law and mixed system fold, there is determined attempt 
to avoid vocalising dissent or divergent opinion in civil law 
systems. This could be ostensibly to avoid any confusion with 
respect to ratio emanating from the same bench and to usher in 
certainty. Thus, the study brings to fore the trend of separate 
opinions being banned in countries such as France, Italy and 
Austria and also in international for a such as the European court 
of Justice. However, it is noteworthy that the European court of 
Human Rights accommodates providing a venue for separate 
opinions. The study, other than, bringing to the fore these titbits of 
information is not judgemental on the acceptability and non-
acceptability of these practices. It focuses on constitutional courts of 
countries that were erstwhile communist states and to their 
unaltered judicial mindscape, even after the regime change. They 
still harbour the frosty orthodox approach to adjudication that is 
hanging onto the formalistic textual approach, undaunted by the 
change in their constitutional value systems and being restrained in 
tapping the interpretative possibilities in the constitution which is 
an evolving organic document. The study though, does not reason 
out the question, why the textualist approach persists, despite 
changing over to another set of constitutional values, philosophies 
and commitments. Some of the reborn republics follow the method 
of ‘comparativism’, influenced by the experiences of other mature 
constitutional systems (for instance the Czech Republic influenced 
by the experience of German Constitutional Courts). They are also 
noticed for stepping out of the traditional dogmatic confines. The 
central European Constitutional courts display a drift away from 
Kelsian restraints on constitutional interpretation that provides no 
avenue for an activist judiciary. Concepts such as rule of law and 
due process can be seen applied frequently in some of these 
jurisdictions.    
The authors are mindful of the likely shortcomings in their 
ambitious endeavour, particularly, the belief that 40 leading cases 
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from a particular jurisdiction could be a dependable sample, 
representing the argumentative patterns of a lifetime of a 
constitutional court. Would ‘leading cases’ essentially depict the 
reasoning patterns or are more ‘routine’ ones more reliable of proof 
? The definition of ‘leading cases’ is a crucial factor to this purpose. 
Simply put, the galling question, is how does one identify a 
‘leading case’ that can also be a reliable guide and a specimen, to 
outline the functioning and patterns of judicial thinking of that 
constitutional court (rather than be an odd aberration).  By leaving 
it to the respective contributors from the selected jurisdictions, the 
authors or investigators have not plugged a basic misgiving for the 
safe realisation of the project objective.   
A flip through the appendix reveals the challenges before each of 
the contributors. Besides an analysis of 40 leading judgements dealt 
with by their constitutional court, the contributor has to answer a 
questionnaire and all of that to be summed up in 15000 words! The 
country reports have to adhere to the strictures of the guidelines 
prescribed by the conreason project and bring out answers from 
which comparisons can be made in order to infer, generalise or 
distinguish. 
Despite the anticipated limitations and self-confessed shortcomings 
(The authors do not claim infallibility!) the work is an 
unprecedented attempt in scale and coverage and will remain a 
must read for those connoisseurs and followers of comparative 
constitutional law. The team leaders (editors) of the work exude a 
cautious humility that the project may be inaccurate in its 
generalisations and inferences, but that, in itself is no reason to 
belittle the significance of the attempt. The project and the resultant 
book are a blueprint for the future constitutional student to rectify, 
work and build on.  
 
 
 
